Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1940

Romney v. Covey Garage et al : Defendant's
Abstract of Record
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart, Stewart & Parkinson & Edwin B. Cannon; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Judd, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent; Attorneys for American
Equitable Assurance Company;
Recommended Citation
Abstract of Record, Romney v. Covey Garage et al, No. 6243 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/664

This Abstract of Record is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. L ROM:-.JEY.
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vsCOVEY GARAGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant .

.\MERICAN EQUITABLE ASSUR- ~- ·
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
.
Interpleaded Defendant and
Respondent
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable P. C. Evans. Judge

Defendant's Abstract of Record
STE\VART, STE\VART & PARKINSON &
ED\VIN B. C ANNO.\
Attorneys /or De/endmtf and
Appellant. Covey Garage

JLTDD.

R~\ Y,

QLTI :\f\IEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys {or Plainli// and
Respondent. E. L Romney
Attorney.-; /or Americ·un
Equitable Assurance Company. u corporation

Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
•Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Pag·e
A II s \\•t 'T

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Assignments of Error ----------------------------------------------------------------------

48

Certificate of the Court --------------------------------------------··-·--------····------

39

('om plaint ______________________________ ---------- ____________ -----------------------------------·

1

Demurrer ---------------------------------------------------------------------------····--------···

4

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ----------------------------------

41

Judgment ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

44

Notice of Appeal ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

45

Order Interpleading American Equitable Assurance Co. ------------

9

Order Permitting Plaintiff to Amend Complaint ------------------------

40

Stipulation Waiving Cost Bond and Stay of Execution

46

Evidence
PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES:
Direct

Cross

Kenneth Jones ---------···

31

Steel Remington ......... .

22

26

E. L. Romney --------------

19

21

C. B. Squires ----------------

12

18

Redirect

29, 31

Recross

30

DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES:
Theron Covey --------------

37

Pat Rozell --------------------

34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. L. ROMNEY.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

COVEY GARAGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case
No. 6243

AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSUR~
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Interpleaded Defendant and
Respondent

Defendant's Abstract of Record
(Title of Court and Cause)
Tr. Page

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff complains of defendant and for
cause of action alleges:
1. That defendant is a corporation organized

and existing under the laws of the State of Utah
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
City; that defendant is, and at all times herein
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2
mentioned was, engaged 1n the business of operating a public garage and accepting cars for
storage and safekeeping for a consideration.
2. That on April 30, 1938 the plaintiff was
the owner of a certain 193'7 Buick sedan automobile of the reasonable value of $1085.00; that on
the evening of said date the plaintiff took said
automobile to the defendant's place of business
in Salt Lake City and then and there delivered
said automobile to said defendant and entered
into a contract with said defendant wherein and
whereby the defendant, for a consideration received by it, agreed to store said automobile an-~
use ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances then and there existing to safely and
securely keep said automobile and to return it to
the plaintiff in the same condition it was in when
received by said defendant.

3. That the defendant negligently and care-

lessly failed to safely and securely keep said
automobile but carelessly and negligently permitted the same to be taken and stolen from said
garage by Albert Freeman and Brady Wayne
Poulson without the consent or authority or permission of the plaintiff or anyone acting on his
behalf.
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4. That as the proximate result of said negligence of the defendant, and while said automobile was in the possession of said Freeman and
Poulson it was wrecked and damaged and the
body, fenders, hood, windows, shock absorbers,
wheels, tires, steering apparatus, headlights, radiator, engine, doors, bumpers, frame and paint
were broken, bent, injured, damaged and destroyed to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $800.00, and
plaintiff was deprived of the use of said car for
a period of 10 days and the reasonable value
thereof is $100.00.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment
against the defendant for the sum of $900.00, together with costs of court herein incurred.

BAGLEY, JUDD, RAY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff

(Duly verified.)
Filed Nov. 17, 1938.
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(Title of Court and Cause)

DEMURRER
Comes now the above named defendant and
demurs to plaintiff's complaint and alleges:
1. That said complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
2. That there is a defect of parties plaintiff in that plaintiff is not the real party in interest or the person entitled to receive the claim
sued upon, as plaintiff's insurer by subrogation
and assignment is a necessary and proper party
to a complete determination of said cause.
3. That said complaint is indefinite and uncertain in the following particulars:

(a) That it does not appear from said complaint how or in what manner defendant was
was careless and negligent in permitting plaintiff's automobile to be stolen, and the acts of
negligence, if any, are not set forth so as to advise defendant of the nature of the negligence
relied upon by plaintiff.
(b) That it cannot he ascertained or determined from paragraph 4 of said complaint the
nature of the damage to plaintiff's said automobile
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amounting to the sum of $800.00, that is, whether
said amount is on account of the cost of repair of
said automobile or is on account of the difference
in value of said car prior to and after said accident, and the nature of said claim is not set
forth in such a manner as to enable defendant to
defend against the same.
(c) That paragraph 4, and particularly that
portion thereof relating to damage in the sum of
$100.00, is indefinite and uncertain in that it does
not appear therefrom that ten days was the time
reasonably necessarily required in order to repair
the damage to said car, nor does it appear that
plaintiff suffered damage by reason of any deprivation of use, nor is the reasonable rental
value of the car set forth in said allegation.

STEWART, STEW ART & CARTER,
C. J. PARKINSON & E. B. CANNON
Attorneys for Defendant

Filed Dec. 8, 1938.

H-9

Defendant's demurrer was overruled, and
clefendant was ordered to answer.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
ANSWER
Comes now the defendant and for its answer
to plaintiff's complaint admits, denies and alleges
as follows:
1. Answering paragraph 1 defendant admits
that it is a corporation as in said paragraph alleged and at the times mentioned in said com-

plaint was operating a public garage in Salt Lake
City.
2. Answering paragraph 2 defendant admits that plaintiff was the owner of a certain
Buick automobile which was left by plaintiff in
defendant's garage for storage on or about the
30th day of April, 1938, and for the ordinary and
usual care of which automobile defendant was
responsible.

3. Answering paragraph :; defendant admits
that said automobile was stolen from defendant's
garage but denies that defendant carelessly and
negligently permitted said automobile to be stolen
as in said paragraph alleged.
4. Answering paragraph 4 defendant denies
that said automobile was in the possession of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Freeman and Poulson as a result of any negligence on the part of defendant, but admits and
alleges that said automobile was stolen and damaged, but denies that plaintiff was damaged to
the extent and in the amount alleged in said
paragraph.
11

3. Denies generally and specifically each and
every material allegation in plaintiff's complaint
contained except as heretofore or hereafter admitted, denied or qualified.

6. Further answering said complaint, and
as a first separate and affirmative defense thereto,
defendant alleges that plaintiff is not the real
party in interest in this proceeding and has not
legal capacity to sue on account of the claim set
forth in his complaint.

7. Further answering said complaint defendant alleges the fact to be that on the 30th day
of April, 1938, plaintiff carried a policy of in-

surance with American Equitable Assurance Company whereby his said Buick sedan automobile
was insured against loss by collision and theft,
and after the theft and wrecking of said automobile plaintiff's said named insurance company
paid to plai:q.tiff the reasonable, fair and proper
damage to said automobile and under and by
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virtue of the terms of: said policy and an agreement of subrogation duly executed by plaintiff
said insurance company became the owner of all
claims for damages against defendant herein and
the cause of action herein sued upon became the
property of said insurance company, and plaintiff herein is not the owner of such claim or entitled to sue the defendant on account thereof.
That said insurance company has heretofore asserted its claim against defendant and has advised
defendant of its rights to recover the damage so
suffered to said automobile and defendant is advised and informed and therefore alleges that said
insurance company has asserted, or may hereafter
assert, a claim against defendant for the same
damages alleged by plaintiff to have been suffered by him. That said insurance company is a
necessary and proper party to a complete determination of all claims on account of the damage
to said automobile and said company should be
made a party to this action either as plaintiff
or defendant.

12

WHEREFORE, defendant prays that an order of this court be made and entered herein
making American Equitable Assurance Company
a party to this action and requiring said company to appear herein either as plaintiff or as a
defendant in order that all rights and claims may
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be fully determined in this action. Defend~nt
further prays that Plaintiff take nothing by reason of his complaint herein; that the same be dismissed and that defendant have and recover its
costs incurred in this proceeding.
STEWART, STEWART & CARTER
Attorneys for Defendant
(Duly verified.)
Filed Jan. 13, 1939.

(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER
Upon filing the verified answer of Covey
Garage, a corporation, and application of said
defendant, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that American
Equitable Assurance Company, a corporation, be,
and it is hereby, interpleaded herein as a defendant and ordered to appear and set forth its rights
and claims, if any, against the defendant, Covey
Garage, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a copy of defendant's ·answer and summons be
served upon said interpleaded defendant.
Dated this 13th day of January, 1939.
ALLEN G. THURMAN

judge
Filed January 13, 1939.

15

Said order, together with a copy of defendant's answer, was served upon the interpleaded
defendant, American Equitable Assurance Company, a corporation, by showing the original order
and delivering a copy of said order to C. Clarence
N eslen, commissioner of insurance, its process
agent, together with a copy of defendant's answer.

(Title of Court and Cause)
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
34

BE IT REMEMBERED that on April19, 1939,
the above-entitled cause came on regularly for
trial before Hon. P. C. Evans, Judge, sitting with·
out a jury, the respective parties being repre·
sen ted by counsel, as follows:
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For the Plaintiff:
For the Defendant:

A. H. Nebeker, Esq.
Ralph T. Stewart, Esq.

The parties announced that they were ready
for trial, and thereupon the following proceedings
were had:

It was stipulated that in the event it should
be decided that plaintiff is entitled to recover
that the damages to be recovered are $'715.00, 1n
addition to the usual taxable costs of court.
3j

It was stipulated that the American Equit. able Assurance Company paid to Mr. Romney,
the plaintiff, under a collision coverage policy,
the amount of his loss under the policy, subject
to the objection of Mr. Nebeker on the grounds of
the immateriality of such stipulation.

37

MR. STEWART: * ~·: * At this time I object to the introduction of any evidence for the
reason and upon the grounds that the. complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action; for the further reason that the
complaint affirmatively shows on its face that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, because
it alleges no negligence on the part of the defendant and because further it affirmatively alleges
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38

that the automobile was stolen from the defendants which automatically releases the defendants
from liability. Allegation of theft shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to both allege and
prove negligence, and in this case there is no
allegation of negligence, except the conclusion that
the defendant negligently permitted the car to be
stolen.
MR. STEWART: I want the record to clear·
ly show at this time that we are prepared to
defend at this time on the basis of the pleadings as they now stand, and not on the basis of
any testimony that might be admitted which we
contend is not admissible under the pleadings.
THE COURT: Your objection may be overruled. You may proceed.

35

C. B. SQUIRES, a witness produced on hehalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

38

My name is C. B. Squires and I am a resident
of Ogden, Utah.

39

Q. Calling your attention to the latter part
of February, 1938, did you, on or about the 26th
day of February of that year, deliver your car
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to the Covey Garage in Salt Lake City, Utah, for
storage?
A.

I did.

MR. STEW ART: Just a moment. I object
to that as irrelevant and immaterial, and the witness having answered before my objection was
made, I move to strike the answer.
THE COURT: The answer may be stricken
merely for the purpose of permitting you to make
your objection.
MR. STEWART: If your honor please, I
understand that the plaintiff proposes to prove
that some two or three months prior to the time
that this particular theft is alleged, that Mr.
Squires left his car at the garage and that it was
not there, or he didn't get it when he came back for
it, or possibly that it was stolen, and it is my
position that such testimony is irrelevant and
immaterial; that it would raise a wholly collateral issue that would have to be separately tried
to determine whether or not in the Squires particular case that car was stolen under certain
circumstances which might be negligent, and that
such issue would be so collateral and immaterial
as to inject into the case a matter entirely irreleSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vant, and if your honor wishes to take the time at
present moment, I will be glad to discuss that
question of law.
40

THE COURT: I am not aware of what the
purpose is; I am not adivsed as to the purpose
here. It is not at all apparent.
MR. NEBEKER:
to ask the questions.

I think it is more orderly

MR. STEWART: Well, I make my objection at this time to any testimony of this witness
relative to a possible previous theft from the defendant garage, any such evidence being wholly
irrelevant and immaterial and being an attempt
to raise a wholly collateral issue that would have
to be fully tried in order to determine whether
or not it might possibly have any bearing upon
this present case.
THE COURT: The objection may be overruled. If it is not material, it will be disregarded.
MR. STEWART:
So that I may not renew
my objection to each and every question that is
asked, may it he stipulated and the court order
that that ohjeGtion go to each separate question
asked by counsel?
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:\1 R.

~EBEKER:

Yes.

On or about February 26, 1938, at about
6:30 or seven o'clock P.M. I delivered by automobile to the Covey Garage in Salt Lake City for
storage and received a claim check. I returned to
claim the car Sunday. February 27th about ten
A. M., presented my claim check to the attendant, who did not deliver the car to me.
A.

41

Q. What was done in your presence there
with respect to attempting to locate your car?
:MR. STEWART: I particularly object to
any such testimony on the grounds already stated
and for the further reason that it could have no
bearing upon the present case.
THE COURT: Well, of course, it is not apparent yet. However, the objection may be overruled.
A. When I presented the claim check I told
him the kind of car and the color.
MR. STEWART: We object to that as being
hearsay and there being no foundation as to whom
he told, or whether he told it to anybody that
would make any such statement binding upon the
defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. NEBEKER: Be is talking to the at.
tendant at the garage.
A.

And the man in charge, I told him that

MR. STEW ART: Then I make the furthe1
objection that anything that might have beer
said or done by an attendant in charge would no1
be binding upon the defendant.
THE COURT: If it is in the nature of all
admission, of courseMR. NEBEKER:
ture of an admission.
42

THE COURT:
ruled.

Q.

No; it won't be in the na·

The objection will be over·

You may state what was done.

A. This man in charge took me all througl
the garage in an effort to locate my car, and the1
he told me I couldn't claim it.
MR. STEWART: Just a moment. I objec
to anything he may have told him while takin1
him through the garage as not in any way bind
ing, or there being no foundation to make tha
binding upon the defendant corporation.
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THE
overruled.

COU~T:

* * * The objection will be

Q. You may answer the question-continue
with your answer.
A. (Answer read) I will have to correct
that. I looked through the garage and the ·car
couldn't be located. Then he told me the car had
been stolen and referred me to the manager of
the garage, and told me then that the car had
been driven out.

43

MR. STEWART: Just a minute. Are you
talking about the same conversation?
A.

Yes, sir.

MR. STEWART: With the same attendant?
A. Same attendant and the manager, that
the car had been driven outMR. STEWART:
goes to all of this?
MR. NEBEKER:

I take it that my objection

Yes.

A. The night before about 11 :50 and that it
had not been located; that they didn't know
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where it was; that they had reported it to the
Police Department of Salt Lake City. My car
was thereafter recovered. It was not damaged from
appearances but mechanically.
CROSS EXAMINATION
44

I don't know myself, except from such statements of the employees, how my car was stolen,
or how the thieves got into the garage, or anything of that nature.
MR. STEWART: Now, at this time, your
honor, we move to strike all of the testimony of
Mr. Squires concerning an alleged taking of his
car on the ground that such testimony is wholly
irrelevant and immaterial, and purports to raise
a wholly collateral, does in fact raise a wholly
collateral matter, that the testimony does not show
any, or disclose any facts as to an occurrence due
to any negligence; it does not show a condition,
which the defendant might or should have remedied in any way; it does not indicate any course
of conduct, or a neglect to remedy any condition,
or any negligence of any employee which would
have any bearing or relationship to a subsequent
theft of an automobile. It is unlike the case that
counsel referred to where the testimony of prior
occurrences in the mind indicated a negligent con-
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clition or a condition that was likely in the future
to cause an accident.
THE COURT:
45

46

47

The motion may be denied.

E. L. ROMNEY, the plaintiff herein, produced as a witness on his own behalf, being first
duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
I am the plaintiff in this action and reside in
Logan, Utah. I delivered my car to the Covey
Garage in Salt Lake for storage between ten
and eleven o'clock in the evening on April 30,
1938. If you know exactly the time that the owl
got in the wires and turned off part of the city
lights, it was probably forty-five minutes after
the lights came back on. I had taken my car
there for storage many times on prior occasions.
I got a claim check when I delivered the car and
my best recollection is that plaintiff's Exhibit
"B" is such claim check. I told them to fill it with
gasoline. I left the car right in front of the north
part of the entrance of the garage where the
·office was. I would say plaintiff's Exhibit "A"
fairly represents the physical lay-out of the Covey
Garage in Salt Lake City.
Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B" were offered and received in evidence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
1 r. Page

48

49

50
51

I left my keys in the car on this occasion and
on all prior occasions when I parked my car
there. It was the practice of the garage to have its
own attendants park my car, drive it into the
garage and place it in a certain position, and
also when I returned to get my car, to bring it
out. During all the time that I had parked my
car there, I had on no occasion taken my car
in myself and taken the keys out. It was a Saturday evening that I left my car there. The
pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk in front of the
garage at the time I delivered my car there was
heavy. A number of people were parking cars
in the garage and going to the dance; young
ladies with party dresses on. After I left my car
at the garage, I went to the Newhouse Hotel.
About two A. M. Sunday the phone rang. It was
someone from police headquarters. I got dressed
and went over io the garage.

It was admitted by the defendant that the
automobile was stolen and that the bailment was
for hire.
MR. STEWART: I move at this time to
strike all of the testimony of this witness on the
ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and not within any issue properly raised
by the pleadings. The pleadings affirmatively
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show that the car was stolen and this testimony
in no way tends to establish any liability on the
part of the defendant.
THE COURT:
52

53

54

55

The motion may be denied.

CROSS EXAMINATION
I know garages storing automobiles usually
tell you to leave the keys in the car, no matter
what garage you go to. Whether I parked my
car in the Covey Garage or elsewhere in the state
or out of the state, they always had me leave
my keys in the car, although I have put my car
in some garages that I insisted taking my keys
with me because I didn't have faith in the garage.
I have been acquainted with the Covey Garage
for many years. I had a very fine hello acquaintance with every one of the boys working at the
garage-a fine bunch of chaps. For several years
I have stored my car there many times at the
garage. They have always given me a check stub
similar to the one I received on this occasion.
STEEL REMINGTON, a witness produced
on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
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56

DIRECT EXAMINATION
I was working at the Covey Garage on the
30th of April, 1938. I recall the occasion the evening of April 30, 1938, and the circumstances
surrounding the removal from the garage of Mr.
Romney's car. I went on duty at one o'clock in
the afternoon. I was not the attendant who received Mr. Romney's car when he took it in, but
I saw it at the time it went into the garage. It
was then between ten and eleven o'clock. Kenneth Jones, Ben Baxter, and myself were on duty
at that time.
MR. STEWART: So there won't be any mistake in the record, I want it understood that my
objection goes to all of this testimony, particularly
for the reason that there is no allegation of negligence and particularly for the reason that the
complaint affirmatively shows that plaintiff is
not entitled to recover, and any testimony of this
nature would be irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT:
ruled.

57

The objection may be over-

Our duties were taking and receiving and delivering cars and we also have the duties of servicing, such as gas and oil. In connection with the
storage garage, we have a gasoline and oil busi-
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58

59

ness and also an automobile laundry, hut the
laundry closes at six o'clock. The garage itself
never closes. It is open day and night. We were not
Yery busy between ten and eleven-thirty P. M. on
~"\.pril 30th. Referring to plaintiff's Exhibit "A",
there are only two doors opening from the service
platform in front of the garage into the storage
portion of the garage. The opening appearing to
the left of these two openings (looking at the
picture) is the wash rack, hut there are usually
cars parked on it and it is not so anybody can
get out of it with an automobile without moving
some others. I don't recall just how the wash rack
was on the evening of April 30th, hut we usually
put two beer trucks on that wash rack every night.
There are doors that close in front of the wash
rack. I don't know whether these doors were closed
between ten and eleven-thirty on the evening of
April 30, 1938, nor do I know whether anything
'"'as parked on the wash rack. Our practice is to
drive cars coming into the garage in the north
entrance and out the south entrance. The garage
faces east, so the north entrance or the one we
usually drove the cars in would appear on the
right hand side of the picture looking at the pichue. I testified about these events I am talking
about and was called as a witness in the case
of State vs. Bud Freeman. Whenever there is
anybody going in the garage, we usually stop
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them and ask what they want. We usually watch
for them. I don't recall anybody particularly that
went in between ten and eleven-thirty on this
evening. It is our practice to not let them go in
the garage without knowing where they are going
unless we know the person. If we don't know
the person we prevent them from going in. Occasionally someone starts in and we keep them
from going in. I am familiar with the storage
portion of the garage itself. Other than the entrances that are shown in this picture, Exhibit
"A", there is a back door on the north side of
the garage about three quarters of the way back.
It was closed and locked between ten and eleven.
The man who takes care of the mail trucks does
that and we usually check him. I don't recall
whether or not I checked it on the evening of
April 30th. It is the duty of one of us to do it
some time in the evening, but this is not assigned
to any particular man. Except this back door I
have mentioned, I don't know of any other entrance into the garage, except an entrance that
goes through the garage and comes out on Fifth
South, but that place is always locked up. Between this door and Fifth South, there is business in there. The door between the garage and
this other place of business is always padlocked.
I didn't check this door on the night of April 30th,
but it stands to reason that it is alwavs locked.
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\Yhen the car belonging to ~lr. Romney was
driven out of the garage, I was standing over by
the little office on the north side of the drive"
either inside or standing right in the door. It was
right close there. Kenneth Jones and Ben Baxter
were with me. I don't remember just what posi·
tion any of us were in. 'Ve were all standing there
together talking. That is the little office that is
shown on the right hand side of the picture west
of the two gasoline pumps. All of that office is
made of glass except the north side and that is
the wall. I observed Mr. Romney's car as it was
driven out of the garag·e. Two people were in t~e
front seat. I had not seen these two people or any
other people while I was there that evening go
into the garage. That evening there were about
seventy-five cars stored on the lower floor of
the garage. That pretty well fills the lower floor
up. We usually put all our regular storage up on
the top floor. There were about forty cars up there.
It is our practice with all cars that are parkerl
on the lower floor to ask the customer who stores
the car to leave his keys in the car. Unless it
is requested from the owner we leave the keys in
all the cars, except dead storage that is in there
for a month or so. It is the custom for the attendants to drive the cars in and park them themselves, and then go and get them and bring them
ont. On the evening of April 30th, I don't recall
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that any cars were standing on what we call the
service platform, just east of the front doors of
the garage. There was a line of cars down on
the south side. That is not at the entrance to
the wash rack, but to the south of the wash rack.
These cars would be just south of the runway
into the wash rack. Between ten and eleventhirty P. M. on April 30th, there were about four
cars there, with their noses pointing to the south.
The wash rack was usually closed for the appearance of the garage. Mr. Jones, Mr. Baxter and
myself all had the same duties of selling gas
and oil and parking and delivering cars. Mr.
Jones came on duty about the same time I did
and Mr. Baxter came on duty at ten o'clock P. M.
CROSS EXAMJNATTO\I

67

With respect to the handling of the cars for
people attending the dance at the Coconut Grove,
the crowd brings the majority or the largest
number of cars for storage to the g·arage between 8:30 and 1.0.30, and then they start coming
to get their cars in leaving the dance about twelve
o'clock, unless it is a big holiday. On this particular night, it was very quiet and we were not
busy between about ten-thirty and twelve o'clock.
There were three of us on duty when this rnr
was taken out. which wa.; between elcYcn and
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eleven-thirty P. M. The office is outside of the
closing doors and about right in the center of
the canopy between the sidewalk and the doors.
It is not any part of the building that closes up,
and from that office, which is glass on three sides,
you have a clear view of the entire front of the
garage and can see any corner of the whole
garage. The doorway that is at the right side
(looking at the picture) next to the office is the
door where cars drive in and the other door,
which is about one-third of the way from the
left side of the picture, is the exit door, and
the entrance or opening, not at the extreme left
of the picture, but nearly to the left side is the
wash rack, where I stated that at night we usually
parked two beer trucks inside. The opening that
appears to be an entrance at the extreme left
edge of the picture is just a little sort of room
that has a door in the back that is always kept
locked and no one ever goes in it and it is not used
as an exit or entrance. When this car was driven
out, it was driven out the south or regular exit.
In looking at the picture it is the one that is
below the greasing sign. The rear entrance that
is about two-thirds of the way towards the back
of the garage on the north side, which I mentioned to Mr. Nebeker, is the entrance that the
government uses to take its mail trucks in at
T1ight. The government employee usually takes
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those trucks in between seven and ten. The last
truck as a rule gets in at ten. The man who takes
care of them has a key to that door, and he drives
them in. He takes them from the outside and
drives them through the door in~o the garage
and then he comes right back and gets another
one. We met cars that came into the front of
the garage under the canopy usually right by the
office or near the office and it is under the canopy that we give them their clairr1 check and take
possession of the cars and then when they came
back with their claim check, one of us would go
and get the car for them. At the time the car
was driven out, myself and the other two employees were there at the front of the garage.
When I first saw it, it was about ten feet on
the inside of the south entrn nee. It hadn't even
emerged from the entranc ~ when I first saw it
moving. There wasn't n~uch that we could rlo
until they got clear oui: on the service entrance
platform. Then I went to my car and went in
pursuit of the Romney car. As the Romney car
came out I observed it almost instantly, and
even before it got through the door. At no time
within an hour prior to the taking of this car had
I observed anybody enter the front of the garage
at all. With respect to letting people ·in the garage.
we had been instructed to find out where they
were going and why, and 'in the event we should
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permit them to go in and we didn't know them, we
usually went with them. The lavatory at this
time was just inside the north entrance. It had
been moved from the rear of the garage to the
front of the garage, just inside the door, so that
people would not have any occasion to go to the
rear of the garage. I haven't the slightest idea how
Freeman and whoever ''las with him got inside
of the garage that night. We have all been wondering and speculating as to how he got in.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

:-.t.

The dark space that appears at the extreme
left hand side of the picture as you face the
picture is an entrance, but it is never used. It
is kept locked all the time, but it has doors. See
it is open here as shown in the picture, but it
has sliding doors. At the time this picture was
taken they were not shut. The picture shows them
open. On dance nights, particularly, it is customary for a number of people to use the rest
room at the garage. A lot of them who have no
cars to park go in there and use the rest room.
They don't come to us and ask if they can use
the rest room, but we see where they are going
before they go in there. We usually watched them
to see where they went and watched them to
see that they came back out. We observed in a
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general way as permitted by the other duties
we had to do. The rest room is about ten feet
inside the door.
The man I said who has a key to the door
on the north side of the garage that takes the
government cars in is an employee of the government. I don't remember just what his name
is. We used to call him Slim all the time. These
mail trucks are left by the drivers on the outside of the garage in the evening. Slim is not one
of their drivers. He is a mechanic. He worked
on the government cars in the evening in that
part of the same building reserved for their trucks.
I believe it was Ben Baxter that parked Mr.
Romney's car on the evening of the 30th. I
wouldn't say for sure. It was parked directly
back or directly down the ramp from the south
door facing east. It was about a hundred feet
from the door to the car as parked.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
77

The front part of the garage is about the
street level. When you get toward the back end
of the garage, you drop about four feet
on a ramp to a lower floor. The car was parked
on the west side of the lower floor at the west
wall.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION

7H

'Ve had a key to the door on the north side
of the garage in addition to Slim, that is, the
station has a key to it. This key is kept on the
register. The people who rented that part of
the building that faces on Fifth South had a key
to the door that communicates between the garage proper and the sales floor that faces on Fifth
South. If someone had a key, he could not come
through from that portion of the building that
faces on Fifth South into the garage proper, as
he would come to a partition and the door is padlocked from the garage or the storage side. The
padlock is on the inside of the Covey Garage.
KENNETH JONES ·was produced as a witness on behalf of plaintiff and was duly sworn.

80
S1

It was stipulated that said witness would
testify substantially the same as the witness
Steel Remington. That he did not see the boys go
into the garage, but that they all saw Freeman
bringing it out, just about the time it came through
the door before it got on the front platform.
MR. NEBEKER: With that T will not cal1
the witness, and plaintiff rests.
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MR. STEWART: At this time, if your
honor please, I renew my objections heretofore
made to the introduction of any evidence relating
or that might have a tendency to relate to any
question of negligence. And particularly I move
to strike the testimony of Mr. Squires on the
ground that it is entirely irrelevant and immaterial and raises a wholly collateral issue, there
not being any evidence that would show a similarity of facts establishing a similarity of theft to
that in this particular instance.
I move to strike all of the testimony of the
witnesses Remington and Jones on the ground that
it is not within any issues in the case, that it is
not within any allegations of negligence and the
complaint itself precludes the introduction of any
evidence of negligence.
And at this time, if your honor please, I also
move for a dismissal of this case,
First, for the reason that the complaint does
not state a cause of action;
82

Second: For the reason that the complaint
excuses a failure of delivery of the car by the
defendant to the plaintiff because the plaintiff
affirmatively alleges that the car was stolen, and
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does not allege any acts of negligence on the part
of the defendant in permitting it to be so negligently stolen;
Also for the reason that there is no evidence
of negligence, that is, assuming such negligence
was pleaded on the part of the defendant, there
being no showing that the defendant conducted
or operated its garage in any manner other than
the ordinary and usual manner of conducting
garages in this particular part of the country, particularly in the vicinity of Salt Lake City, where
garages are kept open for day and night storage.
18

Defendant's motion for non-suit and dismissal was argued and submitted and taken under
advisement by the court, and the further trial of
the case continued without date.

19-;\

Defendant's motion for a non-suit and dismissal was denied June 15,1939.

81

(Monday, Oct. 9, 1939, 10 A. M. Court Reconvened.)
MR. STEWART: Your honor, so there will
be no question about my record, I want to have
the reporter note an exception to th~ court's denial
of the motion for dismissal.
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PAT ROZELL, a witness produced on behalf
of the defendant. being first duly sworn, testified
as follows:

85

I am thirty-one years of age and have been
1n the garage business approximately twelve
years, and I am still operating in such business.
My father has been operating in the business
much longer than that, and I have worked with
him since I was twenty years old. During that
time I have managed or served as assistant manager at the Auto Ramp Garage, the Cullen Garage,
and the North Temple Garage in Salt Lake City,
and at one time, a garage in Pocatello, Idaho,
so that during the twelve years I have been in
the garage business, I have managed some three
or four or more garages and during the past
twelve years, I have also had occasion to visit
numerous garages throughout the country. I am
familiar, particularly in Salt Lake, and in the
State of Utah, with the manner in which garages
are operated, particularly those garages which
cater to live storage, transient storage business
and remain open both day and night. At the
present time, I am manager of the Cullen Garage,
which remains open day and night. I know what
the practice is with respect to the garages that I
am familiar with, and the way substantially all
of the garages in this territory operate in the
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matter of having the keys remain in the automobile stored. The practice is that the customer leaves
the keys in the car when he leaves it there. Unless
the customer insists that his car be locked, we
would rather have them leave the keys in the
car so that it can be moved, or in case of a fire
or something, or some emergency that may come
up, we want to move the car in a hurry, it is
ready to go, and also for the purpose of facilitating
the servicing of cars, checking tires, gas and
matters of that kind. That is generally the practice, not only in this city, but every place I have
been. With respect to the maintenance of employees at the garage, it is practically impossible to keep an attendant at the entrance at all
times. There are things that come up and business to be taken care of that would take the
employees away from the entrance.
It was stipulated that in the operation of
garages such as the one here in question, that
cater particularly to live storage and transient
storage business, that ordinarily sufficient employees. both day and night, are maintained to
handle the ordinary run of business by meeting
the cars coming in at the front entrance, taking
those cars back into the garage, parking them
nnd coming back and meeting other cars that
nre arriving, and similarly when persons come
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for their cars to the garage, to take the claim
check, if it is a claim check storage, and go and
get the car and bring it to the front of the garage
and turn it over to the customer, subject to
plaintiff's objection that such a stipulation was
immaterial and irrelevant.

It was further stipulated that garage attendants of garages similarly situated, during the
times when they are not busy handling cars, also
attend to filling up gas tanks, greasing cars that
the customers want to have greased and perform
those ordinary duties in such a garage, particularly garages that do servicing in the way of oiling and greasing and cleaning and so on.
It was stipulated that on the night that
plaintiff's car was stolen and at the hour of 9:19
p. m. all of the lights in the city, including inside
residence and business lights, as well as street
lights, were out for a period of approximately
five minutes, and that they first went out at
9:19p.m.

It was stipulated that the car was brought
to the garage perhaps half or three-quarters of
an hour after the lights were off.
It was stipulated that as soon as the car
was driven out of the garage, that one of the
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three employees of the garage immediately got
into his car, took after the Romney car and chased
it for some twenty or so blocks all up through the
east part of town. and then back down somewhere near where the car was finally apprehended, or where the collision occurred between
the Romney car driven by Freeman and another
car, resulting in the crash.
93

THERON COVEY, a witness produced on
behalf of the defendant, being first duly sworn,
testified as follows:

94

At the time of the theft I was manager and
part owner of the Covey Garage. At the time the
Romney car was stolen, there was a large sig~
inside of the garage at or near the north entrance
stating that the garage was not responsible for
loss by fire and theft.
Defendant rested.

96

That at the conclusion of all of the evidence,
and on the 9th day of October, 1939, said cause
was orally argued to the court, who took the same
under advisement until the 14th day of November,
1939, when a decision was entered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. That thereafter plaintiff made application to amend the
prayer of his complaint to ask for the allowance
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of interest. That defendant appeared, through his
counsel, and made objection to such proposed
amendment, which objection was denied and the
amendment allowed. That thereafter plaintiff
served and presented proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment to which proposals written objections were duly filed by defendant and defendant served and presented to
the court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. That thereafter and on the 29th
day of December, 1939, the defendant's objections
to said proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law were duly argued and presented to the
court and defendant's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law were duly presented and
on the 29th day of December, 1939, the court
overruled and denied the objections of the defendant and refused to sign and file defendant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and on the 29th day of December, 1939, signed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment.
30

Thereafter and within the time allowed by
law, and on the 30th day of December, 1939, an
order was duly made and entered herein granting
to the defendant to and including the 1st day of
March, 1940, in which to prepare, serve, and file
its bill of exceptions herein.
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CERTIFICATE OF THE COURT

1J

ss.

COeNTY OF SALT LAKE

I, the undersigned, P. C. Evans, the judge
before whom the above entitled cause was tried,
do hereby certify that the foregoing Bill of Exceptions, consisting of pages 1 to 66 inclusive,
contains all of the evidence, both oral and documentary, offered and received in said cause, including all exhibits, which said exhibits and documentary evidence when not attached or contained
in the transcript of evidence are treated and considered as attached and a part of the Bill of Exceptions, and said proposed Bill of Exceptions
contains all objections made, rulings of the Court,
and exceptions taken and all proceedings in the
trial of said cause, and the parties having stipulated that the same may be settled and filed as
the defendant's bill of exceptions herein;
99

NOW, THEREFORE, the same is hereby
settled, allowed, and approved as and for the
bill of exceptions in the above entitled cause
insofar as the same do not _otherwise appear in the
judgment roll or on record.
Dated this 29th day of February, 1940.

P. C. EVANS
judge
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(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER
On motion of Bagley, Judd, Ray & Nebeker,
and good cause appearing therefore,
It is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff
may amend the prayer of his complaint to read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment
against the defendant for the sum of
$900.00, together with costs of court
herein incurred and together with interest at the rate of 6% from April
30, 1938 to the date of judgment.
Dated this 1st day of December, 1939.
P. C. EVANS,
judge
Receipt of a copy of the foregoing order
acknowledged this 29th day of November, 1939
and hereby consent that plaintiff's motion to
amend the prayer of his complaint may be heard
by the court and ruled upon without notice.
STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Defendant
COVEY GARAGE.
Filed Dec. 1, 1939.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The above entitled action came on for trial
before this court on April 19, 1939 and on October
9, 1939. The plaintiff. E. L. Romney, ·was represented by A. H. Nebeker of Bagley, Judd, Ray
and Nebeker, and the defendant, Covey Garage,
was represented by Ralph T. Stweart of Stewart,
Stewart and Carter. The plaintiff \introduced
evidence in support of his complaint and the defendant introduced evidence in support of its answer and both parties rested. The cause being
submitted and the court being fully advised now
makes and enters the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That defendant, Covey Garage, 1s a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Utah with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is and at all times
herein mentioned was engaged in the business of
operating a public garage and accepting cars for
storage and safekeeping for a consideration.
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2. That on April 30, 1938 the plaintiff was

25

the owner of a certain Buick automobile; that hetween 10 and 11 o'clock P. M. the plaintiff took
said automobile to the defendant's garage in Salt
Lake City and delivered said automobile to said
defendant and entered into a contract of storage
and bailment with said defendant and the defendant agreed for a valuable consideration received
by it, to store said automobile and use reasonable
care to safely and securely keep said automobile
and to return it to the plaintiff in the same condition it was in when received by said defendant.
3. That the defendant negligently and carelessly failed to safely and securely keep said
automobile and carelessly and negligently permitted said car to be taken and stolen from said
garage by Albert Freeman and Brady Wayne
Poulsen without the consent or authority or permission of the plaintiff.
4. That as the proximate result of the neg-

ligence of the defendant and while said automobile was in the possession of Freeman and Poulsen
it was wrecked and damaged and the plaintiff
sustained loss resulting therefrom in the sum of
$715.00 together with interest thereon as provided
by law.
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5. That the plaintiff is the real party in in~
terest in this proceeding and has legal capacity
to sue on account of the claim alleged in his

complaint.
6. That American Equitable Assurance Company has no claim against Covey Garage resulting from the damage to said automobile.
From the foregoing findings of fact the court
makes the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiff

is entitled to judgment
against the defendant for $715.00 together with
interest thereon at 6% per annum from April 30,
1938 to the date of judgment and together with
his costs of court herein expended.
2. That said judgment provide that the Amer-

ican Equitable Assurance Company has no
claim against Covey Garage on account of the
damage to plaintiff's automobile.
Dated December 29, 1939.
P.C.EVANS

judge
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(Title of Court and Cause)
JUDGMENT
The above entitled cause came on for trial
before this court on April 19, 1939 and on October
9, 1939. The plaintiff E. L. Romney was represented by A. H. Nebeker of Bagley, Judd, Ray
and Nebeker, and the defendant Covey Garage
was represented by Ralph T. Stewart of Stewart,
Stewart and Carter. The plaintiff having introduced evidence in support of his complaint and
the defendant having introduced evidence in support of its answer and both parties having rested
and the court having heretofore made and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff,
E. L. Romney, have and recover from the defendant, Covey Garage, the sum of $715.00 together
with interest thereon at 6% per annum from April
30, 1938 to December 29, 1939 in the sum of $71.35
and together with costs of court herein expended.

That the American Equitable Assurance Company take nothing from the defendant, Covey
Garage.
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Dated this 29th day of December, 1939.

P. C. EVANS
judge
Filed Dec. 29. 1939.

99

Within the time allowed by law and the
order of the court, defendanfs bill of exceptions,
containing all of the evidence both oral and documentary and proceedings in the trial was duly
settled.

(Title of Court and Cause)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

31

TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO AMERIICAN EQUITABLE

ASSURANCE

COMPANY,

A

CORPORATION, AND JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY, &
NEBEKER, THEIR ATTORNEYS:
YOU,

AND

EACH

OF

YOU,

WILL PLEASE

T A K E N 0 T I C E that Covey Garage, a corpora-

tion, defendant herein, hereby appeals to the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from the decision of the court and judgment entered thereon
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on the 29th day of December, 1939, and from
the whole thereof.
This appeal is taken on both questions of
law and fact.
Dated this 29th day of February, 1940.

STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON
EDWIN B. CANNON
Attorneys for Defendant, Covey
Garage, a corporation
Filed March 4, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause)
32

STIPULATION
Comes now the plaintiff by his attorneys and
hereby stipulates that the filing of a statutory
cost bond on appeal herein and of a supersedeas
bond on appeal is hereby waived and that the
defendant, Covey Garage, a corporation, may proceed on appeal with like effect as though such
undertakings were filed in accordance with the
statute.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·47
It is further stipulated that pending final
disposition of the appeal that execution against
said defendant may be stayed.
Dated this 29th day of January, 1940.
JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Filed March 5, 1940.
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No. 6243
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH

E. L. ROMNEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent
-vsCOVEY GARAGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSURANCE CO:MP ANY, a corporation,
Interpleaded Defendant
and Respondent.

ASSIGNMENTS
OF ERROR

Comes now the appellant, Covey Garage, a
corporation, and upon the record heretofore transmitted to and filed in this court pursuant to the
appeal herein, assigns the following errors upon
which it will rely for a reversal of the decision
and final judgment of the court entered on the
29th day of December, 1939.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4Y
I.
The court erred 1n overruling defendant's
demurrer to plaintiffs complaint on.. each and
every ground set forth in said demurrer. (Tr. 8,
9; Ab.Sf,

II.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the introduction of any evidence
raised prior to the introduction of any evidence
(Tr. 37-38; Ab. 11-12), during the course of the
trial (Tr. 51, 56; Ab. 20, 22), and prior to final
submission of the case. (Tr. 81, Ab. 32), and
which objection was based on the insufficiency of
plaintiff's complaint.

III.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
motion to strike all the testimony of the witness,
E. L. Romney, as follows:
"MR. STEWART: I move at this
time to strike all of the testimony of this
witness on the ground that it is ·incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and not
within any issue properly raised by the
pleadings. The pleadings affirmatively
show that the car was stolen and this testimony in no way tends to establish any
liability on the part of the defendant.
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"THE COURT: The motion may be
denied." (Tr. 51, Ab. 20).

IV.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
motion to strike all of the testimony of the witnesses Remington and Jones, which motion was
as follows:
"MR. STEWART: * * ~-: I move to
strike all of the testimony of the witnesses
Remington and Jones on the ground that
it is not within any issues in the case, that
it is not within any allegations of negligence and the complaint itself precludes
the introduction of any evidence of negligence." (Tr. 81, Ab. 32).

v.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the examination of the witness, C. B.
Squires, as follows:
"MR. STEWART: If your honor
please, I understand that the plaintiff proposes to prove that some two or three
months prior to the time that this particulare theft is alleged, that Mr. Squires left
his car at the garage and that it was not
there, or he didn't get it when he came
back for it, or possibly that it was stolen,
and it is my position that such testimony
is irrelevant and immaterial; that it would
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raise a wholly collateral issue that would
have to be separately tried to determine
whether or not in the Squires particular
case that car was stolen under certain circumstances which might be negligent, and
that such issue would be so collateral and
immaterial as to inject into the case a matter entirely irrelevant, and if your honor
wishes to take the time at present moment,
I will be glad to discuss that question of
law. * * * I make my objection at this
time to any testimony of this witness relative to a possible previous theft from the
defendant garage, any such evidence being wholly irrelevant and immaterial and
being an attempt to raise a wholly collateral issue that would have to be fully
tried in order to determine whether or not
it might possibly have any bearing upon
this present case.
"THE COURT: The objection may
be overruled." (Tr. 39-40, Ab. 13-14).

VI.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the examination of the witness, C.
B. Squires, as follows:

"Q. What was done in your presence there with respect to attempting to
locate your car?
"A. When I presented the claim check
I told him the kind of car and the color.
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"MR. STEWART: We object to that
as being hearsay and there being no foundation as to whom he told, or whether he
told it to anybody that would make any
such statement binding upon the defendant.
"MR. NEBEKER: He is talking to
the attendant at the garage.
"A. And the man in charge, I told
him that.
"MR. STEW ART: Then I make the
further objection that anything that might
have been said or done by an attendant in
charge would not be binding upon the defendant.
"THE COURT: If it is in the nature
of an admission, of course"MR. NEBEKER: No; it won't be in
the nature of an admission.
"!"'·•

"THE COURT:
be overruled.

"Q.

The objection will

You may state what was done.

"A. This man in charge took me all
through the garage in an effort to locate
· my car, and then he told me I couldn't
claim it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"MR. STEv\' ART: Just a mmnent. I
object to anything he may have told him
while taking him through the garage as
not in any way binding, or there being no
foundation to Inake that binding upon the
defendant corporation. ~~ ~~ ~~
"THE COURT: The objection will
be overruled. You may answer the question-continue with your answer.
"A.
(Answer read) I will have to
correct that. I looked through the garage
and the car couldn't be located. Then he
told me the car had been stolen and referred me to the manager of the garage,
and told me then that the car had been
driven out.
"MR. STEWART: Just a minute.
Are you talking about the same conversation?
"A.

Yes, sir.

"MR. STE,VART:
tendant?

'Vith the same at-

"A. Same attendant and the manager, that the car had been driven out"MR. STEWART: I take it that my
objection goes to all of this?
"MR. NEBEKER:

Yes.
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"A. The night before about 11:50
and that it had not been located; that
they didn't know where it was; that they
had reported it to the Police Department
of Salt Lake City." (Tr. 41, 42, 43; Ab.
15, 18).

VII.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike all of the testimony of the witness,
C. B. Squires, which motion was urged at the
conclusion of the testimony of said witness, as
follows:
"MR. STEWART: Now, at this time,
your honor, we move to strike all of the
testimony of Mr. Squires concerning an
alleged taking of his car on the ground
that such testimony is wholly irrelevant
and immaterial, and purports to raise a
wholly collateral, does in fact raise a wholly
collateral matter; that the testimony does
not show any, or disclose any facts as to
an occurrence due to any negligence; it does
not show a condition, which the defendant
might or should have remedied in any way;
it does not indicate any course of conduct,
or a neglect to remedy any condition, or
any negligence of any employee which
would have any bearing or relationship to
a subsequent theft of an automobile. It is
unlike the case that counsel referred to
where the testimony of prior occurrences
in the mind indicated a negligent condition
or a condition that was likely in the future
to cause an accident.
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·'THE COURT:
denied.

~~ ~~ ~-:"

(Tr.

~-k

The motion may be
:\b. 18).

and prior to final submission of the case as follows:
,.MR. STE,YART: ~·: ~~ ~~ Particularly
I move to strike the testimony of Mr. Squires
on the ground that it is entirely irrelevant
and immaterial and raises a wholly collateral issue, there not being any evidence
that would show a similarity of facts establishing a similarity of theft to that in this
particular instance." (Tr. 81, Ab. 32).

VIII.
The court erred in overruling defendant's
motion for a non-suit or dismissal at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence for the reason that
plaintiff's complaint was insufficient and that
there was no evidence of any act of negligence on
the part of defendant, nor evidence of any act
of negligence on the part of defendant which was
the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff's
automobile. (Tr. 19-A, Ab. 33).

IX.
The decision of the court is contrary to and
against the law in that plaintiff's complaint is
insufficient, and there is no evidence of any act
of negligence on the part of defendant, nor evidence of any act of negligence on the part of
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defendant which was the proximate cause of the
damage to plaintiff's automobile. (Tr. 25, 26;
Ab. 43, 44).

X.
That the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the findings of fact numbered three and four,
in that there is no evidence of any negligence on
the part of defendant, nor any evidence of any
negligence on the part of defendant which was
the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff's
automobile. (Tr. 23, Ab. 42).

XI.
That the findings of fact are insufficient to
sustain conclusion of law No. 1. and the judgment,
in that there is no finding of any specific negligence on the part of defendant, nor any finding
of any negligence on the part of defendant which
was the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff's automobile. (Tr. 25, 26; Ab. 42-44).

XII.
The court erred in permitting over defendant's objection plaintiff to amend his complaint
subsequent to the trial, and after a decision had
been entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant to ask for the allowance of interest. (Tr. 23, 96;
Ab. 37-38, 40).
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XIII.
The court erred in making its findings of fact
Nos. 5 and 6 as follows, to-wit:
"5. That the plaintiff is the real
party in interest in this proceeding and has
legal capacity to sue on account of the
claim alleged in his complaint.

"6. That American Equitable Assurance Company has no claim against Covey
Garage resulting from the damage to said
automobile." (Tr. 23, Ab. 43).

XIV.
The court erred in making and entering its
conclusion of law No. 2, as follows:
"2. That said judgment provide that
the American Equitable Assurance Company has no claim against Covey Garage
on account of ·the damage to plaintiff's
automobile." (Tr. 25, Ab. 43).

XV.
That the findings of fact are not supported
by the evidence. (Tr. 24, 25; Ab. 41-43).

XVI.
That the judgment is not supported by, and is
contrary to the evidence. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44).
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XVII.
That the evidence and findings of fact do not
support the conclusion of law. (Tr. 25, Ab. 43).
XVIII.
That the judgment is not supported by the
findings of fact. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44).
XIX.
That the judgment is contrary to and against
the law. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44).
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the decision and judgment of the District Court herein
be reversed and that said court be instructed and
directed to make findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law.
STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON
EDWIN B. CANNON
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
Received copy of the foregoing Assignments
of Error this 5th day of April, 1940.
JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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JUDD, RAY QUINNEY, & NEBEKER
Attorneys for American Equitable
Assurance Company, a corporation,
Interpleaded Defendant and
Respondent.

Filed ............................................................ , 1940.
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